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Macroeconomic Stress Testing and the Resilience of the Indian 
Banking System: A Focus on Credit Risk 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper undertakes a macroprudential analysis of the credit risk of Public Sector Banks 
during the liberalization period. Using the Vector Autoregression methodology, the paper 
investigates the dynamic impact of changes in the macroeconomic variables on the 
default rate, the Financial Stability Indicator of banks by simulating interactions among all 
the variables included in the model. Feedback effects from the banking sector to the real 
economy are also estimated. The impact of variations in different Monetary Policy 
Instruments such as Bank Rate, Repo Rate and Reverse Repo Rate on the asset quality of 
banks is examined using three alternative baseline models. Impulse Response Functions 
of the estimated models are augmented by conducting sensitivity and scenario stress testing 
exercises to assess the banking sector’s vulnerability to credit risk in the face of 
hypothetically generated adverse macroeconomic shocks.   
Results indicate the absence of cyclicality and pro-cyclicality of the default rate. 
Adverse shocks to output gap, Real Effective Exchange Rate appreciation above its trend 
value, inflation rate and policy-induced monetary tightening significantly affect bank 
asset quality. Of the three policy rates, Bank Rate affects bank soundness with a lag and 
is more persistent while the two short-term rates impact default rate instantaneously but is 
much less persistent. Scenario stress tests reveal default rate of Public Sector Banks could 
increase on an average from 4% to 7% depending on the type of hypothetical 
macroeconomic scenario generated. An average buffer capital of 3% accumulated during 
the period under consideration could thus be inadequate for nearly twice the amount of 
Non-Performing Assets generated if macroeconomic conditions worsened.  
An important policy implication of the paper is that as the Indian economy moves 
gradually to Full Capital Account Convertibility, the banking sector is likely to come 
under increased stress in view of the exchange rate volatility with adverse repercussions 
on interest rates and bank default rates. In this emerging scenario, monetary policy stance 
thus emerges as an important precondition for banking stability. The study also highlights 
the inadequacy of existing capital reserves should macroeconomic conditions deteriorate 
and the urgency to strengthen the buffer capital position.  
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Macroeconomic Stress Testing and the Resilience of the Indian 
Banking System: A Focus on Credit Risk 
Section 1: Introduction 
The increasing occurrence of banking crisis spanning the last two decades has contributed 
to the growth of a new area of research broadly known as Macroprudential analysis 
which delves into the relation between macroeconomic variables and Financial Stability 
Indicators (FSIs).1 Macroprudential analysis has also focused on the ability of banks to 
withstand macroeconomic shocks based on stress tests in several developing and 
developed countries in the globalizing era. Macroeconomic stress testing has thus become 
an important tool for financial stability analysis. Assuming credit risk to be one of the 
most dominant risk categories for banks in India, this paper is an application of 
macroeconomic stress testing of the default rate of banks using the Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) methodology to test the soundness of the Indian banking system.  
 With the implementation of the Narasimham Committee recommendations on 
banking reforms, a new era has been ushered in the Indian banking sector. Our banks 
have gradually emerged as stronger entities in the contemporary deregulated and 
liberalizing environment. They have managed to reduce their bad loans and are focusing 
on better lending practices. In spite of this improving landscape it is of great significance 
to know how the effects of the changing macroeconomic scenario and monetary policy 
stances work upon the financial health of banks as the Indian economy integrates with the 
global economy. Considering the need for such a study for India, the paper employs a 
Recursive Vector AutoRegression (RVAR) model and makes an attempt to explore the 
                                                 
1
 FSIs are aggregated micro-prudential indicators used by supervisors to assess bank soundness. 
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macroeconomic determinants of the asset quality of the Indian banking sector. The 
contribution of this paper lies in using an unrestricted VAR model for the analysis of the 
impact of real, financial and monetary policy shocks on the banking system and the 
feedback effects. Though there are several techniques to assess the vulnerability of a 
financial system to exceptional but plausible macroeconomic shocks, this paper has 
followed the simple approach of augmenting the estimated Impulse Response Functions  
(IRFs) of the endogenous variables of the estimated VAR model with stress testing 
exercises. 
The remaining paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature that has underlined the role of macroeconomic variables in explaining the asset 
quality of banks and has performed stress tests to assess the impact of worsening 
macroeconomic conditions on bank loan quality. Section 3 deals with some of the 
macroeconomic changes and policy shifts in the contemporary Indian economy and their 
expected effects on the credit risk of PSBs.  Data sources and methodology are discussed 
in Section 4. Empirical results are stated and analyzed in Section 5. Finally Section 6 
concludes the study and offers some policy implications. 
Section 2: Present State of Art 
There exists an elaborate body of research on the role of bank-specific and 
macroeconomic factors in influencing banking sector fragility for both advanced and 
emerging market economies. While bank-specific factors are found to have contributed 
towards the lack of strong and vibrant banking systems in many economies, 
macroeconomic disturbances such as business fluctuations and adverse movements in 
interest rates and exchange rates are revealed to have underlined some of the major 
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systemic banking crises in the 1990s.  Based on the growing significance of role of 
macroeconomic factors in causing banking crisis, there has been an increasing emphasis 
on the study of interactions between macroeconomic trends and banking fragility. This 
has led to the development of macroprudential analysis which makes an important 
contribution in assessing the macroeconomic causes and the soundness and 
vulnerabilities of financial systems to macroeconomic shocks. 
Cyclicality and pro-cyclicality of bank asset quality: Economic expansion which is 
associated with an increase in corporate profits and household incomes enables borrowers 
to be in a better position to service bank loans leading to reduction in bad loans. But 
when recession sets in, the converse usually occurs. This is known as cyclicality of bank 
lending.  When asset quality deteriorates due to economic slowdowns there is likely to be 
a second round effect from the banking sector to the real economy. The pressure to 
maintain minimum capital adequacy due to enhanced credit risk shrinks credit supply and 
further amplifies the business cycles and bad loans in bank books.  This is referred to as 
the pro-cyclicality of bank loans. Cross-country studies find economic recessions have 
been one of the major causes of banking crisis (Demirguc–Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; 
Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999;  Hardy & Pazarbasioglu, 1999). Evidence on cyclicality of 
bank asset quality is also found in some country-specific studies. Salas & Saurina (2002) 
find significant role of economic downturns in increasing problem loans in Spanish 
banks. Meyer & Yeager (2001) find that the loan quality of local banks in US is affected 
by local economic slowdowns. According to Shu (2002), bad loans as a proportion of 
total loans of banks decrease with high economic growth in Hong Kong. However, a few 
studies have refuted the cyclicality hypothesis. Jordan & Rosengren (2002) observe that 
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only a very few banks failed in the US in the 2001 recession. Lindhe (2000) found the 
annual GDP growth to be positive during the Swedish banking crisis.  
Increasingly a large number of studies have employed VAR approach to focus on the 
impact of business cycles on bad debts of banks.  Gambera (2000) finds farm income and 
state annual product have significant influence on bank loan quality in the US. 
Quagliariello (2003) confirms the cyclicality of write-offs to total loans for Italian banks.2  
Some papers have documented the impact of output gap on bank balance sheets. Bank 
failures increase (or decrease) with increase (or decrease) in output gap (Lindhe, 2000 ; 
Pain, 2003 Hoggarth, Logan & Zicchino, 2005 & Amediku, 2007).3 Recently some 
studies have investigated the feedback effect from the banks to the real economy using 
the VAR approach. Marcucci & Quagliariello (2005) find evidence of both cyclicality 
and pro-cyclicality of asset quality for Italian banks. According to Hoggarth et al (2005) 
there is cyclicality of aggregate write-offs, but no feedback effect from UK banks to the 
real economy. In contrast, Baboucek & Jancar (2005) find no substantiation of the 
cyclicality hypothesis of Salas & Saurina (2002) find significant role of economic 
downturns in increasing problem loans in Spanish banks. Meyer & Yeager (2001) find 
that the loan quality of local banks in US is affected by local economic slowdowns. 
According to Shu (2002), bad loans as a proportion of total loans of banks decrease with 
high economic growth in Hong Kong. However, a few studies have refuted the cyclicality 
hypothesis. Jordan & Rosengren (2002) observe that only a very few banks failed in the 
US in the 2001 recession. Lindhe (2000) found the annual GDP growth to be positive 
during the Swedish banking crisis.  
                                                 
2
 NPAs and write-offs (bank losses net of recoveries) are used interchangeably as indicators for explaining the asset quality of banks. 
3
 Output gap is the difference between potential and actual output.                                 
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Increasingly a large number of studies have employed VAR approach to focus on the 
impact of business cycles on bad debts of banks.  Gambera (2000) finds farm income and 
state annual product have significant influence on bank loan quality in the US. 
Quagliariello (2003) confirms the cyclicality of write-offs to total loans for Italian banks.4  
Some papers have documented the impact of output gap on bank balance sheets. Bank 
failures increase (or decrease) with increase (or decrease) in output gap (Lindhe, 2000 ; 
Pain, 2003 Hoggarth, Logan & Zicchino, 2005 & Amediku, 2007).5 Recently some 
studies have investigated the feedback effect from the banks to the real economy using 
the VAR approach. Marcucci & Quagliariello (2005) find evidence of both cyclicality 
and pro-cyclicality of asset quality for Italian banks. According to Hoggarth et al(2005)  
there is cyclicality of aggregate write-offs, but no feedback effect from UK banks. In 
contrast, Baboucek & Jancar (2005) finds no corroboration of the cyclicality of Non 
Performing Assets (NPAs) but confirm pro-cyclicality hypothesis for banks in Czech 
economy.  Filaso (2007) on the other hand, find evidence of weak pro-cyclicality for the 
Italian banking sector.6     
Monetary Policy and bank asset quality:  Since the seminal contribution of Sims (1980), 
the use of the VAR approach for the empirical investigation of monetary policy shocks 
has gained momentum. Graeve et al (2008) find a monetary contraction by one standard 
deviation leads to a significant though small increase in the probability of banking 
distress in Germany. The effect is however substantially low if capitalization is high. but 
                                                 
4
 NPAs and write-offs (bank losses net of recoveries) are used interchangeably as indicators for explaining the asset quality of banks. 
5
 Output gap is the difference between potential and actual output.                                 
6
 They believe fall in output can undermine the solidity of the banking system only if the contraction in output is far more severe than 
any previous recession. 
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confirm pro-cyclicality for banks in Czech economy. Filaso (2007) on the other hand, 
find evidence of weak pro-cyclicality for the Italian banking sector.7     
Monetary Policy and bank asset quality:  Since the seminal contribution of Sims (1980), 
the use of the VAR approach for the empirical investigation of monetary policy shocks 
has gained momentum. Graeve et al (2008) finds a monetary contraction by one standard 
deviation leads to a significant though small increase in the probability of banking 
distress in Germany. The effect is however substantially low if capitalization is high. 
Filaso (2007) finds bank soundness indicators display minor variations as monetary 
policy conditions are tightened for countering financial crisis.  
Impact of other macroeconomic factors on bank asset quality: A large number of 
studies have emphasized the prominent influence of interest rates in explaining bank asset 
quality. Clair (2004) and Lindhe (2000) assert that credit quality is adversely affected by 
increase in nominal interest rates. Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache (1998) and Gizycki 
(2001) find aggregate credit risk to vary with real interest rates. Shu (2002) finds that bad 
loans decline as consumer price inflation and property price inflation increase.  He also 
finds credit portfolios of banks are also affected by appreciation of nominal exchange 
rates due to increasing foreign loan defaults.  
Stress testing macroeconomic shocks and their impact on bank loan quality : The IMF 
and the World Bank formally introduced macro-prudential stress tests as a key element of 
IMF member countries have competed or have been undergoing Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) which was developed in recognition of important multi-
faceted interlinkages between a country’s financial system and its economy. The purpose 
                                                 
7
 They believe fall in output can undermine the solidity of the banking system only if the contraction in output is far more severe than 
any previous recession. 
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of FSAP involving stress tests is to assess the resilience of banks to macroeconomic 
shocks which is of central importance to financial stability. Stress tests permit a forward-
looking analysis to assess the vulnerability of a banking system in particular, to either a 
major fall in exchange rate, large increase in interest rate, a very sharp and prolonged 
contraction in the economy or combination of these shocks. Stress testing simulations are 
performed under exceptional but plausible events to assess vulnerability of loan quality to 
adverse macroeconomic shocks.  IRFs of VAR models have been popularly used to 
conduct stress tests (Baboucek & Jancar, 2005; Filosa, 2007; Tracey, 2005  and 
Amediku, 2007). Stress tests using VAR models outperform other forms of stress tests by 
estimating changes in Non-Performing Loans as a result of macroeconomic shocks 
distinct from idiosyncratic shocks, by supporting links to well established 
macroeconomic theories and monetary policy and facilitating stress testing of the stability 
of the banking system both in the form of sensitivity analysis of scenario analysis 
(Amediku, 2007, p 5-6). 
The purpose of this paper is to use a RVAR model to a) empirically investigate the 
dynamics between default rate of Public Sector Banks (PSBs) and key macroeconomic 
variables and compare the effects of different policy rates on bank asset quality b) 
perform stress tests to assess the banking sector’s vulnerability to credit risk and 
determine the early signals for deterioration of loan quality. 
Section 3: Macroeconomic Changes and Banks’ Asset Quality: Theoretical 
Underpinnings and the Contemporary Indian Economy  
           Since economic liberalization in 1991, gradual changes in the macroeconomic 
environment  are expected to work upon the balance sheets of banks. During the 1990s, 
there have been periodic fluctuations in the growth rate of output in the Indian economy. 
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There were two protracted economic downturns and NPA levels were soaring in the mid-
1990s. The influence of banks on output variations is reflected in the bank credit-GDP 
ratio.  
The twin objectives of monetary policy in India that have evolved over the years are price 
stability and ensuring adequate flow of credit to facilitate economic growth. In recent 
years financial stability has been added as yet another objective of monetary policy with 
top priority. During the 1970s and 1980s, in the era of fiscal dominance in the Indian 
economy, market-oriented interest rates had little relevance. Direct instruments like 
administered interest rate ceilings, bank credit ceilings, reserve requirements and priority 
sector lending functioned as the key instruments of monetary management. Since 1991, a 
host of interest rates emerged as significant signals of monetary policy stance in India. 
Indirect instruments have replaced the direct instruments.  
In this new scenario, Bank Rate as a Monetary Policy Instrument (MPI) has become very 
significant for the entire financial system since its reactivation in the 1997-98. During 
1997-2003, the Bank Rate was changed 14 times of which 8 changes took place during 
1997-99 and remaining 7 changes occurred during 2000-2003 (Insert Table 1 here). The 
growing significance of the Bank Rate as a MPI during this period is thus quite evident.   
The Bank Rate acts as an important benchmark for determination of other interest rates 
such as PLR (Prime Lending Rate), Sub-PLR and Benchmark-PLR (BPLR) charged by 
banks from the ultimate borrowers.  From Sept 1998 to March 2004, RBI has estimated 
the interest rate pass-through effect for PLR to be 0.61, which means that for every 100 
basis points (bps) increase in the Bank Rate, PLR increases by 61 bps.8 Thus every time 
                                                 
8
 Report on Currency and Finance,  2003-04, Chapter 7,  p  203 
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the Bank Rate is adjusted, it has important repercussions on commercial bank lending 
rates and asset quality is likely to be impacted. 
  In the past few years, short-term interest rates such as Repo Rate and Reverse Repo Rate 
have played a crucial role in RBI monetary policy stance and have thus emerged as 
dynamic indicators of interest rates (Insert Table 2 here). Since the introduction of 
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) in June 2000, the RBI has been injecting liquidity in 
the system through Repos and absorbing liquidity from the system on a daily basis 
through Reverse Repos (Insert Table 3 here).9     
The RBI cannot afford the luxury of adopting inflation targeting as the single main 
objective of monetary policy in India.10  The multiple objectives of our monetary policy 
include growth, price and financial stability.  In India the emphasis is currently more on 
managing inflation expectations. Price stability is maintained through various fiscal, 
monetary and administrative measures.  In this controlled inflationary regime there is not 
much variation between real and nominal interest rates. The RBI tolerance level of 
inflation is in the range of 5-5.5%. When headline inflation (Wholesale Price Index, WPI) 
exceeds the tolerance limit, RBI pursues monetary tightening to rein in inflationary 
pressures. Supply side shocks, poor level of intermediation between producer and 
consumer, presence of strong demand pull factors and rising oil prices account for the 
rising inflationary trend in India. These pressures exert a critical influence on the RBI 
monetary policy stance and RBI adjusts the policy interest rates (Repo Rate, Reverse 
Repo Rate or Bank Rate) to reach an acceptable level of inflation.  Policy interest rates 
also adjust to suck out excess liquidity and counter the expansionary impact of sudden 
                                                 
9
 In 2007-08 the objective of monetary policy has been unidirectional to reduce inflation. For this two instruments were used the 
Repo/Reverse Repo Rates and the CRR. The first was to directly affect the cost of borrowing while the second was to reduce the 
quantum of lendable resources. 
10
 ‘RBI Roots for Managing Inflation Expectation’ Economic Times 18.06.07 
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spurts in liquidity from the system caused by heavy capital inflows. The rise in interest 
rates is likely to aggravate the NPA problem in all sectors including retail credit such as 
home loans, car loans, personal unsecured loans and corporate loans. 
From full convertibility on the current account in 1991 to gradual relaxation in the capital 
account, the exchange rate policy has undergone significant changes. The increasing 
domestic and external financial integration has led the monetary policy stance to be 
influenced by exchange rate fluctuations via its effect on inflation.  In recent times this 
has been one of the most important features of short-term monetary policy adjustments in 
India.  
            There is a large empirical literature on the causes of  NPAs in the Indian banking sector. 
Rajaraman, et al (1999) find operating environment and regional exposure of banks play 
a significant role in explaining the inter-bank variations for the year 1996-97. Another 
study by Rajaraman and Vashishtha (2002) reveal that levels of operating efficiency 
explain the higher than average NPAs for a group of banks. Ranjan & Dhal (2003) find 
that terms of credit, bank size and macroeconomic shocks influence bank asset quality. 
However, none of the studies in the Indian context have focused on the dynamic 
interlinkages between macroeconomic shocks and bank asset quality. 
            Asset quality measured by NPAs is one of the leading indicators of the financial health of 
PSBs in India. Since financial liberalization in India, banks have widened their operations 
beyond their traditional roles of lending and accepting deposits and have entered into new 
lines of business. Consequently they have become more vulnerable to market risks (viz 
equity risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk), operational risks and even off -balance 
sheet risks. However credit risk still largely explains banking fragility in India. Its 
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predominance is reflected in the composition of Capital Adequacy Ratio where 70% of 
capital is allocated for credit risk and 30% for market risk and operational risk. A lion’s 
share of gross NPA of Scheduled Commercial Banks is concentrated solely in PSBs.  
This paper thus focuses on PSBs alone. (Insert Table 3 here).11 
Section 4: Data Sources and Methodology  
The period for the study extends from 1995-2007. Default rate (DR) has been used as the 
FSI in this exercise.12 Besides, a few of macroeconomic, monetary and financial variables 
have been selected cautiously based on econometric considerations of constructing a 
parsimonious VAR model. These are output gap, Bank Rate/ Repo Rate/Reverse Repo 
Rate, Consumer Price Inflation and Real Effective Exchange Rate.  
Default rate (DR) is based on gross NPAs and gross advances.13 The data on CPI 
(1982=100) and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER, 1993-94=100) are available on a 
monthly basis. The monthly data on Consumer Price Inflation (CPI, 1981-82=100) has 
been shifted to the base year 1993-94 to maintain conformity with other variables. To 
remove the seasonality present in GDP and CPI data, seasonal adjustments based on the 
Moving Average method is made in each case. Output gap (OG_GDP) is the difference 
between the log of the Hodrick Prescott (HP) filtered GDP series and the log of  the GDP 
series.14 The resulting series after first logarithmic differencing of seasonally adjusted 
CPI is the Inflation Rate (INF). The REER deviation from its trend (R_T) is the 
                                                 
11
 Gross NPAs as % of gross advances for PSBs after touching an all time high of 24.8 % in 1993-94   gradually declined to 5.53% in 
2004-05 which was quite high by international standards.   
12
 IMF (2006) includes Non-Performing Loans in its set of  FSIs for Macroprudential analysis. 
13
 The default rate in month ‘ t’  is the ratio of incremental  gross NPAs in month ‘ t’  to performing loans in month ‘ t-1’. Performing 
loans in a certain period is the difference between gross advances and  gross NPAs in that period. The definition of default rate 
adopted in this paper is similar to that of Quagliariello  & Marcucci  (2003,  p  28). The reason for not using Net NPAs and net 
advances in the calculation of default rate is because larger provisioning for bad debts may lead to lower Net NPAs whereas the gross 
NPA figure could actually be rising.     
14
 Output gap is the deviation of actual output from potential output that is sustainable in the long run. Since sustainable output cannot 
be observed directly,  Hodrick Prescott (HP) filtered series from eviews5 software is used to estimate the potential output.  
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difference between the HP trend value of the REER and the REER itself. The policy rates 
are the Bank Rate (B), Repo Rate (RR) and Reverse Repo Rate (RRR). The data for all 
the variables have been obtained from RBI website  www.rbi.org.in (Insert Table 4 here). 
Three  baseline models are estimated using three alternative policy rates. For the period 
1997-2003 a RVAR model is developed using Bank Rate as the MPI. For the post-LAF 
period that is 2001-2007 where the short-term rates viz the Repo Rate and Reverse Repo 
Rate are frequently used to convey RBI monetary policy signals two alternative RVAR 
models are estimated.  
In this paper the RVAR model is employed as the variables used are a mix of real and 
financial variables. VARs perform  well not only in capturing the data generating process 
of macroeconomic aggregates but also in capturing  the contemporaneous  and lagged 
relation between real economy and banking sector without imposing any apriori 
theorization (Graeve et al , 2008, p7). The relevant shocks are identified by the Granger 
causality tests and the response of the system to these shocks is analyzed by the IRFs and 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). Before explaining the detailed 
methodology below, the stationarity properties of the time series data and the 
determination of the lag order of the VAR model are discussed.  
Stationary Tests of Endogenous  Variables 
Several unit root tests such as Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF, 1979), Phillips-Perron ( 
PP, 1988), Generalized Least Squares (GLS) de-trended Dickey-Fuller test ( by Elliot, 
Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996) henceforth known as DF-GLS test and Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt & Shin ( KPSS,1993)  tests have been used to check for the stationarity 
of the variables.  
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Conventional unit root tests are known to lose power dramatically against stationary 
alternatives with a low order moving average process: a characterization that fits well to a 
number of macroeconomic time series. Along the lines of the ADF test, a more powerful 
variant is the DF-GLS test proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (ERS, 1996). In the 
ADF approach either a constant or a constant and linear time trend are included to take 
into account the deterministic components of the data. ERS propose a simple 
modification of the ADF in which data are de-trended before the unit root test is 
conducted. 
Main criticism of the ADF and PP unit root tests is that the power of these tests are low if 
the process is stationary but has a root close to the non-stationary boundary. These also 
have low power in small samples. To overcome this issue Kwaitkowski, Phillips,  
Schmidt & Shin (1993)  have developed a unit root test that has the null hypothesis of 
stationarity and the alternative hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
Determination of Optimal Lag Length 
The VAR model is estimated using symmetric lags indicating the same lag length for all 
variables in all the equations of the model. Symmetric lag VAR model is easily estimated 
since the specification of all equations of the model are the same and estimation by OLS 
yields efficient estimates. On the issue of the lag-length selection, a maximum of 12 lags 
is considered and five criteria namely Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error 
(FPE), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and  
Hannan & Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC)  are considered. The smallest value for 
each criterion corresponding to a certain lag length is chosen as the lag length for that 
criterion. The choice of appropriate lag order of the VAR model is based on these criteria 
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and the diagnostic tests that test for the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskadasticity 
in the residuals.  
    Recursive VAR 
   In a recursive dynamic structural equation model, the ordering of the variables is very 
crucial. The first variable is a function of lagged values of all variables including itself, 
the second variable is a function of contemporaneous values of first variable and lagged 
values of all variables and so on. The variables in a RVAR structure are ordered 
according to their speed of reaction to a particular shock. The financial variables such as 
policy interest rate, inflation rate and exchange rate are ordered here at the end of the 
RVAR implying that they react instantaneously to shocks to real side variables. In 
contrast the real variables such as default rate and the output growth rate placed at the 
beginning of RVAR respond to shocks in financial variables only after a lag. The output 
growth rate is ordered after the Default Rate reflecting that business cycles affect bank 
asset quality after a lag.  Our RVAR model includes the following endogenous variables 
in this exact order i.e. deviation of the REER from its trend value (R_T), Inflation rate 
(INF), Bank Rate (B), Output Gap (OG_GDP) and Default Rate that is DR ←  
OG_GDP ←  B ←  INF ←  R_T. 
The two other alternative RVAR model orderings using Repo Rate and Reverse Repo 
Rate are as follows: 
DR ←OG_GDP ←  RR ←  INF ←  R_T. 
DR ←OG_GDP ←  RRR ←  INF ←  R_T. 
 Consider  the following equations  
 17
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In the above equations k represents the lag length. The first equation shows the effect on 
default rate due to past innovations to it and to all other variables. The second equation 
shows the impact on output gap due to current and past shocks to default rate and past 
shocks to all other variables. The third equation shows the impact on Bank Rate due to 
current and past innovations in default rate and output gap and past innovations in all 
other variables. The fourth equation shows the effects on inflation rate due to current and 
past shocks to default rate, output gap and Bank Rate and past shocks to the remaining 
variables. Finally the last equation shows the effects on deviation of the REER from its 
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trend value due to past shocks to itself and current and past shocks to default rate, output 
gap, Bank Rate and inflation rate. 
Granger Causality Tests 
A variable x is said to Granger cause a variable y if past values of x are useful for 
predicting values of y. Consider the first equation of the five -variable VAR with a lag 
order of   k  for the recursive ordering DR ←  OG_GDP ←  B ←  INF ←  R_T 
Consider  equation (1) 
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    In this case there are five null hypotheses against five alternative hypotheses. 
a) DR Granger causes DR if 0.......: 112110 ==== kH ααα  is rejected against AH : at 
least one 0≠i1α  
b) OG_GDP Granger causes DR if 0.......: 222210 ==== kH ααα  is rejected 
against AH : at least one 0≠i2α  
c) B Granger causes DR if 0.......: 332310 ==== kH ααα  is rejected against AH : at least 
one 0≠i3α  
d) INF Granger causes DR if 0.......: 442410 ==== kH ααα   is rejected against AH : at 
least one 0≠i4α  
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e) R_T Granger cause DR if  0.......: 552510 ==== kH ααα  is rejected against AH : at 
least one 0≠i5α  
 These tests show the p-values associated with the F-test for testing whether the relevant 
set of coefficients are 0 or not. Rejection of 0H  through the standard F-test attests to the 
inclusion of a particular variable in the inclusion of another variable. 
Impulse Response Functions 
An IRF traces the dynamic response of current and future values of each of the variables 
to a one-unit increase in current value of one of the VAR errors within two standard error 
bands. Consider the 5 equations corresponding to the recursive VAR. A change in t1ε , 
will immediately change values of current   ‘DR’.  It will also change all future values of 
‘OG_GDP’, ‘B’, ‘INF’ and  ‘R_T’ since lagged  ‘DR’ appears in all five equations. This 
is the interpretation of the IRF when the innovations t1ε , t2ε , t3ε  t4ε  and t5ε  are 
uncorrelated. But the innovations are not usually uncorrelated. Cholesky decomposition 
takes care of correlated errors via orthogonalised IRF where errors are made completely 
independent so that the covariance matrix of the resulting innovations is diagonal. 
However one serious problem with orthogonalised IRF is that it is not invariant with 
respect to the ordering of the variables. Pesaran & Shin (1998) have developed the 
generalized IRF analysis, which is invariant with respect to the ordering of variables.  
Since Cholesky decomposition is sensitive to a particular kind of ordering, the VAR 
model has been reordered and results have been checked to see whether there are any 
notable differences. If there are no significant changes in the results it will mean our 
results are robust and there is no further need for applying the generalized IRF 
methodology. 
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Forecast Variance Decomposition Analysis 
FEVD computes the forecast error variance decomposition which provides the proportion 
of the total forecast-error variance of each variable that is caused by each of the shocks or 
disturbances in the system. The FEVD table gives information about the relative 
importance of each random innovation on a particular variable. For the variable that 
comes first in the VAR ordering the only source of one period ahead variation is its own 
innovation and the first number is always 100. The decomposition of variance thus 
critically depends on the ordering of equations.  
Section 5: Estimation Results:  
Considering the change in the definition of NPAs from 180-day norm to 90-day norm 
from April 2004, the Chow breakpoint test is applied to detect the presence of an 
endogenous structural break in the gross NPA series.15 Results show there is no 
significant structural break on that specified date (Insert Table 5 here). The general 
descriptive statistics of all the endogenous variables are given below (Insert Table 6 and 
Chart 1 here). The multicollinearity matrix shows poor pair-wise correlations among the 
regressors indicating basically independent variables (Insert Table 7 here). 
We have conducted the empirical exercises on two periods respectively. The results are 
presented for the period 1997-2003 during which the Bank Rate functioned as an active 
Monetary Policy Instrument and for 2001 to 2007 where the short-term rates viz the Repo 
Rate and the Reverse Repo Rate operated as signals of RBI monetary policy stances. 
1997-2003 
                                                 
15
 To move towards international best practices and impart greater transparency, it was decided to classify loans as non-performing 
where the interest and/or installment of principal remain overdue for a period of more than 90 days from the year 2004.  
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AIC, SIC and HQIC along with sequential LR tests and FPE are reported for all the 
endogenous variables. Numbers in bold indicate the minimum along each column and 
correspond to the lag chosen by each criteria. For this exercise, a lag of three months is 
chosen as the order of the VAR model (Insert Table 8 here). This choice of this lag order 
is also consistent with the LM test and White test indicating the absence of 
autocorrelation and heteroskadasticity respectively, in the residuals. The results of the 
correlation residual matrix indicate the absence of any high correlation among any pair of 
residuals (Insert Table 9 here). The unit root tests reveal that the default rate, output gap, 
REER deviation from its trend and the inflation rate are stationary with trend and 
constant term. None of the policy rates such as the Bank Rate, Reverse Repo Rate or 
Repo Rate are stationary. Further the rates have not been log differenced, as many 
observations will be reduced to zero making them meaningless (Insert Table 10 here).  
We have followed here the basic idea of Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) that for VARs 
with some non-stationary variables   there is some loss in efficiency but not consistency. 
However, even if there is loss in efficiency Sims (1980) recommended against 
differencing the variables since the objective of VAR analysis is to study inter-
relationship among variables and not determine efficient estimates. 
 The default rate equation in the baseline model has a modest explanatory power 
with an adjusted 2R -statistics of 76%.16 The result for Durbin Watson test for residual 
autocorrelation shows a value of nearly 2. All the coefficients have their expected sign in 
the default rate equation. The coefficient for output gap, Bank Rate and inflation rate 
have positive signs while the coefficient of REER deviation from trend is negative. The 
                                                 
16
 Results are not shown here due to space constraint. 
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roots of the characteristic polynomial reveal, no root lies outside the unit circle. VAR, 
thus satisfies the stability condition and is stationary (Insert Chart 2 and Table 11 here). 
Preliminary indications on the interactions among the variables suggest the following. 
The null hypothesis of Granger causality is not rejected for cyclicality of the default rate 
or for any feedback effect from the banking sector to the real economy. This is perhaps 
comprehensible as the time lag of three months may not be sufficient for any discernible 
interaction between the real sector and the banking sector. The lagged effect of central 
bank’s steady dose of monetary tightening is also expected to weigh on bank asset quality 
via lending rates. Results indicate the Bank Rate Granger cause the default rate as 
expected via lending rates.  Inflation rate and the appreciation of the REER over its trend 
value also Granger cause the default rate.  Other results show the default rate Granger 
cause Bank  Rate and inflation rate , the policy rate is Granger caused by the inflation rate 
while REER appreciation over its trend value and inflation rate Granger cause each other 
(Insert Table 12 here). 
The chart on IRFs reflect the Cholesky decomposition and are sensitive to the particular 
kind of recursive ordering already stated (Insert Chart 3 here). Each variable responds to 
a unit shock equal to one standard deviation in all the variables including it. IRFs always 
assume positive (increase) shocks to a variable. Each response is produced via interaction 
among all the variables included in the VAR model. In this exercise simulations have 
been performed for a sufficiently long period of 5 years to detect the response pattern as 
interactions among the variables prominently occur only at a significantly long period. 
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The standard characteristic of the IRFs is that the effect of the shocks die down gradually 
and move very close to 0 as shown over a period of 60 months.17  
The response of default rate to itself is positive but the effects eventually disappear. The 
IRF gives evidence of the feedback effect from the banks to the real economy for a period 
of two months as output gap increases. Loan quality is significantly affected following a 
monetary policy impulse after a lag via rise in lending rates and increases persistently 
from the 3rd month to nearly 1% over 12-month period, declining thereafter.18 The 
response of the default rate is positive and persistent increasing up to 3% following an 
inflationary shock and dying down subsequently.  As REER appreciates above its trend 
value slowdown in exports occurs and this affects the default rate with a time lag. The 
IRF shows due to positive innovation in rate of change of REER the response of default 
rate falls for 4 months and then increases. During the period under consideration it is 
observed as REER appreciated due to heavy capital inflows, the RBI raised its policy 
interest rate to restrict inflation and eventually this led to loan defaults in future. This has 
been proved in this analysis through Granger Causality tests and IRFs.  
  The IRFs also support many other basic economic hypotheses. Increase in  
output gap causes decrease in inflation rate,  increase in Bank Rate following inflationary 
shock , fall in inflation rate following monetary policy shock,   increase in inflation rate 
as REER appreciates sharply above its trend value after a time lag and finally REER 
appreciation causes deceleration in output growth.  
                                                 
17
 The IRF graphs however show response of variables to shocks over a period of 12 months 
18
 In this essay there is no distinction among banks based on their financial health. Not all banks react by pulling up their lending rates 
in the event of a policy rate hike. It is expected that adequately capitalized banks react to a much lower degree than banks with a low 
capital scenario. Thus from the monetary policy perspective   the financial health of banks in the transmission of monetary policy 
shocks has been ignored in this analysis. This is one shortcoming of this analysis. 
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The column standard error is the forecast error of the variable for each forecast horizon 
(Insert Table 13 here). The remaining columns show the % of variance due to each 
innovation.   Each row adds up to 100.  FEVD for default rate show 12 months ahead 
56.32%, 1.30%, 3.57, 20.39% and 18.40% of forecast error in default rate are explained 
by itself, output gap, Bank Rate, inflation rate and REER appreciation above its trend 
value respectively.  Policy interest rate change is quickly transmitted to default rate via 
rise in lending rates. 5 years ahead almost 9% of forecast error of default rate is explained 
by Bank Rate alone.   
The sensitivity of the responses gained within the framework of impulse response analysis 
are tested for robustness by re-ordering of the variables . When we changed the positions of 
the variables in the original model we find results of the baseline model are invariant to the 
new ordering. 
2001-2007 
Since we want to compare the impact of the policy rates on bank asset quality we present 
the IRFs for the post-LAF period during 2001-2007 when Repo Rate and Reverse Repo 
Rate were actively used as signals of monetary policy stances by the RBI. The VAR 
model corresponding to each of these policy rates has an optimal lag order of 1 
respectively. LM test and White test indicate the absence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskadasticity in the residuals at this lag order. Default rate responds almost 
instantaneously to shock in Repo Rate or Reverse Repo Rate (Insert Charts 4 and 5 here).  
Default rate increases persistently up till the fourth month to 0.025% in response to shock 
in Repo Rate and slowly dies down. Shock to Reverse Repo Rate however causes the 
default rate to rise to 0.05% in the second month and thereafter falls successively. 
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Comparing these results with the earlier result, it is clear that while asset quality is slowly 
impaired, is more substantial and takes a long time to recover following a shock to the 
Bank Rate, bank soundness respond more quickly, is less significantly affected and 
recovers more rapidly following shocks to the short-term policy rates.    
Results of Stress Testing Default Risk: Sensitivity and Scenario analysis 
Stress testing exercises are conducted for the baseline VAR model estimated during the 
period 1997-2003 when Bank Rate was the major active MPI. The Jarque-Bera statistics 
for the time series of endogenous variables during that period indicate that they do not 
follow normal distribution. Further since all these variables are leptokurtic the occurrence 
of fat-tailed events is far more probable than the normality assumption. It is known that 
shocks equal to 2 or 3 standard deviations fall on the 95% or 99% quantiles of the 
empirical distributions of the time series. Using the 99th quantile approach uses the 
information in the time series both in order to determine the relatively large shocks and to 
limit the magnitude with respect to the maxima of the time series. The shocks are 
generated for the different variables (Insert Table 14 here). If we take into account the 
99th quantile, the response of default rate to all the endogenous variables including itself 
are produced from the standard impulse response analysis for various months (Insert 
Table 15 here). Acceleration in default rate causes it to rise by 5%, 6-months ahead and 
subsides thereafter. The response to inflation rate is also about the same. Though 
response to rise in the Bank Rate is a bit delayed it rises by about 5%, 12-months ahead 
but dies down later. The most delayed effect of default rate occurs in response to output 
gap. However the response is much lower compared to the other impulses. The most 
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prominent early warning signals of worsening loan quality are thus the default rate itself, 
followed by changes in policy interest rate and growth of consumer price inflation.  
Three scenarios are considered (Insert Table 16 here). The first scenario (‘a’)combines 
positive shock to Bank Rate and inflation rate. The second scenario (‘b’) combines 
impulses to Bank Rate, inflation rate and output gap. The third scenario (‘c’) combines 
REER appreciation above its trend value, inflation rate and Bank Rate. The three 
scenarios show default rate of PSBs can rise by 4% to 7% if such adverse conditions 
actually exist in the economy.  
The pertinent question that can now be raised is whether PSBs are resilient enough to 
counter such adversities. During 1996-97 to 2002-03, PSBs have build up some amount 
of buffer capital of an average of 3% which can insulate them from extreme shocks. 
However as the stress tests reveal, default rate may rise from  4 % to 7% in extreme 
adverse scenarios , the average buffer CAR of  3% above the 9% stipulated level may be 
inadequate (Insert Chart 6 here) 
Adverse monetary shocks, inflation rate and output gap may impair the soundness and 
profitability of Indian PSBs, the dominant segment of our banking system. Thus banks 
should use all possible means to accumulate more reserves as preparedness for more 
adverse times to come in future  
Section 6: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
     
This paper applies VAR methodology to stress test the Indian PSBs. It estimates the changes 
in macroeconomic variables on the default rate of the banking industry and provides a 
dynamic statistical interpretation of the macroprudential concept of credit risk created by 
simulating interactions between all the variables included in the model. The empirical 
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findings are in conformity with the theoretical assumptions underlying the investigated 
transmission and with the empirical findings presented in the VAR literature.  
           There is no evidence of any cyclical and pro-cyclical patterns between banks’ 
default rate and output gap. Similar results are obtained as the output gap replaces Index 
of Industrial Production (IIP).  Default rate responds very positively to inflationary 
shocks. As REER appreciates (assuming capital inflows) inflation follows soon after and 
policy interest rates rise to contain inflation and stabilize the exchange rates leading to 
deterioration of bank asset quality.  Exchange rate shocks are thus likely to enhance 
future credit risk of PSBs. This finding is also a reflection of the impossible trinity of 
independent monetary policy, capital flows and exchange rates.    
There is an important implication of the result of increase in the policy interest rate and 
its transmission to the bank default rate via pass-through effects to the lending rates. 
Shocks to Bank Rate affects the default rate the most compared to Repo Rate and 
Reverse Repo Rate. These findings suggest that bank default rate is influenced by 
external disturbances through the nexus of exchange rates and domestic interest rates. 
The paper has also made another important contribution to literature. The resilience of PSBs 
has been tested by generating adverse macroeconomic scenarios. It has been found based 
on the IRFs of the RVAR model used in this study that default rate of PSBs can increase 
on an average  from  4% to 7% depending on the type of scenario. Buffer capital of an 
average of 3% accumulated during 1996-97 to 2002-03 may not be sufficient from the 
nearly twice the amount of NPAs generated in the face of the most unfavourable 
macroeconomic scenarios during that period. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Frequency of Bank Rate Change  
 Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, various issues 
Table 2:  Frequency of Repo Rate and Reverse Repo Rate Change 
                     REPO RATE REVERSE   REPO  RATE 
FREQUENCY RANGE FREQUENCY RANGE 
2000-01 21 9.00-15.00 26 7.00-15..50 
2001-02 3 8.00-8.75 3 6.00-6.75 
2002-03 3 7.00-7.50 3 5.00-5.75 
2003-04 1 6.00 1 4.50 
2004-05 NIL 6.00 1 4.75 
2005-06 2 6.25-6.50 3 5.00-5.50 
2006-07 5 6.75-7.75 2 5.75-6.00 
2007-08 Nil 7.75 Nil 6.00 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, various issues 
Table 3: Share of Gross NPAs by Bank Groups (1996-97 to 2007-08) 
Year 1996 
-97 
1997- 
98 
1998-
99 
1999-
00 
 
2000- 
01 
 
2001- 
02 
 
2002- 
03 
 
2003-
04 
 
2004-
05 
 
2005-
06 
2006
-07 
2007
-08 
PSBs 92 .13 
 
89.84 88.06 87.60 85.63 79.64 76.92 79.42 80.97 18.94 77.1
8 
71.8
4 
Private 
banks 
5.37 6.27 7.93 8.11 950 16.44 18.96 15.94 15.10 15.29 18.3
3 
23.0
8 
Foreign 
banks 
2.50 3.89 4.01 4.30 4.86 3.92 4.11 4.64 3.92 3.77 4.48 5.08 
Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, various issues 
Table 4:   Data Sources of Variables   in Unrestricted VAR Model 
 
VARIABLE Symbol Data Source  
1 Default rate constructed from gross NPA and gross 
advances.  
DR Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy  2009-10 
2 Output gap (difference between  log of seasonally 
adjusted GDP from its Hodrick Prescott filtered trend) 
OG_GDP Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy  2009-10 
4 Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Industrial workers. 
(Base year 1982=100 shifted to 1993-94=100) 
INF Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy  2009-10 
Period Frequency of Bank Rate Change Range 
1950s 2 3.0-4.0 
1960s 4 4.0-6.0 
1970s 3 5.0-9.0 
1980s 1 9.0-10.0 
1990s 10 8.0-12.0 
April 1997- March 2003 14 6.25-11.00 
March 2003- March 2008 Nil 6.25 
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5 REER deviation from trend value is the difference 36–
currency trade-based Real Effective Exchange Rate 
index  (Base year 1993-94=100) 
R_T Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy  2009-10 
6 Bank Rate B Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy  2009-10 
7 Repo Rate  RR Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy  2009-10 
8 Reverse Repo Rate RRR Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy  2009-10 
 
 
Table 5. Chow Breakpoint Test on the Default Rate series (Breakpoint April 2004) 
 
F-statistic 1.026641     Probability 0.360695 
Log likelihood ratio 2.093482     Probability 0.351080 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Time Series of Endogenous Variables in RVAR 
Model 
     A OG_GDP B RR RRR INF R_T 
 Mean  0.033 6.02E-05  0.080 7.187 5.479  0.486  0.0517 
 Median  0.010  0.001   0.070 7.000 5.500  0.406  0.071 
 Maximum  0.606  0.104  0.120 9.000 6.750  3.512  8.522 
 Minimum -0.153 -0.107  0.060 6.000 4.387 -1.782 -6.038 
 Std. Dev.  0.103  0.037  0.023 0.933 0.694  0.669  2.581 
 Skewness  2.391 -0.045  0.780 0.208 -0.020  0.829  0.267 
 Kurtosis  12.42  3.734  2.062 1.819 1.746  6.330  3.254 
 Jarque-Bera  715.7  3.519  21.23 5.285 5.311  88.85  3.249 
 Probability  0.000  0.102  0.000 0.071 0.070  0.000  0.324 
 Observations  154  154  154 81 81  154  154 
 
Table 7: Correlation Matrix  of  Variables   in RVAR Model 
 DR OG_GDP B RR RRR INF R_T 
DR  1.000  -0.017  0.396  0.455  0.541  0.070 -0.1212 
OG_GDP -0.109 -0.005  0.088 -0.070 -0.027  0.070 -0.124 
B  0.397 -0.026  1.000  0.688  0.621  0.038 -0.179 
RR  0.455 -0.024  0.6888  1.000  0.807  0.039 -0.125 
RRR  0.542 -0.110  0.6218  0.807  1.000  0.090 -0.018 
INF  0.070    0.122  0.038  0.039  0.091  1.000  0.064 
R_T -0.121   0.064 -0.179  -0.125 -0.018  0.064  1.000 
 
         
         Table 8: Optimal Lag length of RVAR model 
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 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SIC HQIC 
0  337.3626 NA   6.38e-09 -4.681164 -4.577085 -4.638870 
1  898.2382  1074.353  3.36e-12 -12.22871 -11.60424 -11.97495 
2  969.3133  131.1387  1.76e-12 -12.87765  -11.73279  -12.41243 
3  999.9580  54.38353  1.63e-12 -12.95716 -11.85190 -12.28046 
4  1037.757  64.41720  1.37e-12 -13.13742 -10.95177 -12.24926 
5  1067.525  48.63607   1.29e-12 -13.20458 -10.49854 -12.10496 
6  1085.923  28.76291  1.44e-12 -13.11159 -9.885162 -11.80050 
7  1115.877  44.72014  1.37e-12 -13.18137 -9.434545 -11.65881 
8  1135.141  27.40352  1.53e-12 -13.10058 -8.833362 -11.36655 
9  1154.940  26.77042  1.71e-12 -13.02732 -8.239716 -11.08183 
10  1191.251  46.53992  1.53e-12 -13.18664 -7.878639 -11.02968 
11  1227.608   44.03766  1.38e-12  -13.34659 -7.518200 -10.97817 
12  1243.975  18.67232  1.67e-12 -13.22500 -6.876218 -10.64511 
 
 
Table 9: Residual Correlation Matrix 
 DR OG_HP B INF R_T 
DR  1.000000  0.078601  0.172676  0.028174  0.098388 
OG_GDP  0.078601  1.000000  0.016087  0.127937  0.042464 
B  0.172676  0.016087  1.000000 -0.202969  0.259626 
I  0.028174  0.127937 -0.202969  1.000000 -0.113784 
R_T  0.098388  0.042464  0.259626 -0.113784  1.000000 
 
Table 10: Results of Unit root tests  
 Order of 
integration 
ADF 
(Intercept & 
 trend) 
DF-GLS 
(Intercept & 
trend) 
PP 
(Intercept & 
trend) 
KPSS 
(Intercept & 
trend) 
DR I(0) -4.72 -3.92 -5.38  0.32 
OG_GDP I(0) -8.34 -6.41 -5.18  0.03 
B I(0) -1.98 -2.06 -1.48 1.58 
RR I(0) -2.10 -1.88 -1.72  0.91 
RRR I(0) -3.46 -3.48 -2.83 0.14 
INF I(0) -7.28 -7.03 -9.28  0.06 
R_T I(0) -3.46 -3.48 -2.83 0.14 
     Note: Critical values of ADF & PP tests are  -4.01,  -3. 43  _-3.15,   at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
    Critical values of DF--GLS test  are  -3.52, -2.97 &  -2.68 at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
    Critical values of KPSS test   are  0.216, 0.146 & 0.119,    at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
 
Table 11: Stability condition in VAR 
 
ROOT MODULUS 
 0.944640  0.944640 
 0.826758 - 0.148843i  0.840050 
 0.826758 + 0.148843i  0.840050 
 0.635294 - 0.413210i  0.757853 
 0.635294 + 0.413210i  0.757853 
 0.281255 - 0.679442i  0.735354 
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 0.281255 + 0.679442i  0.735354 
-0.423090  0.423090 
 0.249919 - 0.169115i  0.301760 
 0.249919 + 0.169115i  0.301760 
 
Table 12:  Results of Granger Causality Tests (3 lags) 
NULL HYPOTHESIS F-TEST SIGNIFICANCE 
 LEVEL 
COMMENT 
1) Default Rate versus Output Gap 
     i) OG_GDP does not Granger cause DR 
ii) DR does not Granger cause OG_GDP 
 
0.026 
0.081 
 
 0.99402 
 0.96998 
 
Do not reject 0H  
Do not reject 0H  
2) Default Rate versus Bank Rate 
       i) B does not Granger cause DR 
       ii) DR does not Granger cause B 
 
5.293 
3.497 
 
0.00241 
0.02001 
Reject 0H  
Reject 0H  
3) Default Rate versus Inflation Rate 
i) INF does not Granger cause DR 
  ii) DR does not Granger cause INF 
 
 
10.966 
3.5113 
 
5.6E-06 
0.01967 
 
Reject 0H  
Reject 0H  
4) Default Rate versus deviation of 
REER from its HP trend 
i) R_T does not Granger cause DR 
ii) DR does not Granger cause R_T 
 
 
1.48 
0.546 
 
 
0.02645 
0.65189 
 
 
Reject 0H  
Do not reject 0H  
5) Output Gap versus Bank Rate 
i) B does not Granger cause OG_GDP 
ii) OG_GDP does not Granger cause B 
 
1.554 
1.611 
 
0.20832 
0.19454 
 
Do not reject 0H  
Do not reject 0H  
6) Output Gap versus Inflation rate 
i) INF  does not Granger cause OG_GDP 
ii) OG_GDP does not Granger cause INF 
 
0.171 
0.455 
 
0.91502 
071459 
 
Do not reject 0H  
Do not reject 0H  
7) Output Gap versus deviation of 
REER from its HP trend 
    i) R_T does not Granger cause OG_GDP 
    ii)OG_GDP does not Granger cause R_T 
 
 
0.8611 
0.264 
 
 
0.46560 
0.43275 
 
Do not reject 0H  
Do not reject 0H  
8) Bank Rate versus Inflation Rate 
     i) INF does not Granger cause B 
     ii) B does not Granger cause INF 
 
2.766 
0.7458 
 
0.04830 
0. 52856 
 
Reject 0H  
Do not reject 0H  
9) Bank Rate versus deviation of REER 
from its HP trend             
             i)  R_T does not Granger cause B 
             ii) B does not Granger cause R_T 
 
 
0.1200 
0.5584 
 
 
0.94802 
064423 
 
Do not reject 0H  
Do not reject 0H  
10)Inflation  rate versus deviation of 
REER from its HP trend          
           i) R_T does not Granger cause INF 
           ii) I does not Granger cause R_T 
 
 
5.848 
3.054 
 
 
0.00128 
0.03419 
 
Reject 0H  
Reject 0H  
 
Bold significance levels indicate significance at the usual levels 
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Table 13 :  Results on  Forecast Error Variance Decomposition  
  
Decomposition of Forecast error variance of DR as explained by the effect of shocks                           
Step 
Ahead 
S.E DR OG_GDP B INF R_T 
1  0.053282  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
3  0.074182  77.68623  0.067897  1.172441  15.32973  5.743701 
6  0.089875  61.52935  0.619590  1.291011  23.47592  13.08412 
9  0.094766  58.94139  0.677475  1.845128  21.57348  16.96252 
12  0.097655  56.32567  1.308919  3.569571  20.39191  18.40394 
60  0.103554  51.74728  2.583039  9.136343  18.34081  18.19252 
 
Decomposition of Forecast Error Variance of OG_GDP as explained by effect of  
shocks  
Step Ahead S.E DR OG_GDP B INF R_T 
1 
 0.009748  0.617805  99.38219  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
3 
 0.019395  0.554549  95.57987  2.079487  1.550351  0.235746 
6 
 0.020706  0.737643  92.10904  2.563976  4.253995  0.335344 
9 
 0.021591  0.776273  90.34187  4.407513  4.007417  0.466928 
12 
 0.021705  0.942267  89.63837  4.791309  4.160344  0.467706 
60 
 0.021799  1.258484  89.05060  4.922336  4.220656  0.547921 
 
Decomposition of Forecast Error Variance of  B as explained by effect of shocks  
Step Ahead S.E DR OG_GDP B INF R_T 
1  0.002862  2.981705  0.000636  97.01766  0.000000  0.000000 
3  0.005795  16.42451  0.111828  80.76685  1.249493  1.447317 
6  0.008016  18.47465  4.563234  70.67835  3.505213  2.778552 
9  0.009563  20.69232  6.864525  64.33545  4.491432  3.616270 
12  0.010429  22.65070  6.516396  60.51618  5.555987  4.760739 
60  0.012276  24.43290  6.705621  55.38974  5.790497  7.681244 
 
Decomposition of Forecast Error Variance of  INF  as explained by effect of shocks  
Step Ahead S.E DR OG_GDP B INF R_T 
1 
 0.648868  0.079376  1.59044  4.465908  93.86427  0.000000 
3 
 0.756873  3.120364  1.19132  3.795647  91.49705  0.395608 
6 
 0.807264  8.147587  2.09533  3.941841  85.23758  0.577660 
9 
 0.820427  8.443796  2.15615  3.976667  84.33737  1.086005 
12 
 0.824272  8.669275  2.19811  4.020089  83.72034  1.392179 
60 
 0.830901  8.818785  2.33116  4.667752  82.43744  1.744857 
 
Decomposition of Forecast Error Variance R_T as explained by effect of shocks  
Step 
Ahead 
S.E DR OG_GDP B INF R_T 
1  1.116568  0.968015  0.121371  6.063834  0.505908  92.34087 
3  1.818634  1.497635  8.145723  3.829049  6.539628  79.98796 
6  2.263577  5.807114  13.51151  3.992628  13.57874  63.11001 
9  2.440053  8.825651  13.20368  5.881393  16.68006  55.40921 
12  2.510120  10.07188  12.89555  6.968179  17.64851  52.41588 
 35
60  2.541191  10.36768  12.76896  7.519695  17.63654  51.70712 
 
 
Table 14: Generation of Extreme Macroeconomic Shocks 
 
DR OG_GDP B INF R_T 
95th quantile 0.228 0.034 0.12 1.99 3.62 
99th quantile 0.308 0.048 0.11 2.75 5.54 
Standard deviation 0.560 0.021 0.016 0.78 2.59 
95th  quantile / std deviation 0.407 1.619 6.875 2.55 1.39 
99th  quantile / std deviation 0.550  
2.285 7.500 
 
3.52 
 
2.13 
Note: Values are in percentage 
 
Table 15:  Sensitivity Stress Tests:  Stressed Response of Default Rate (99th  
quantile) 
 
DR OG_GDP B INF R_T 
12 0.141 -2.085 4.131 2.383 -1.427 
24 -0.429 1.240 3.750 2.078 -0.968 
36 -0.179 1.081 2.981 1.700 -0.771 
Note: Responses are in percentage points 
 
Table 16:  Scenario Stress Tests :  Stressed Response of Default Rate  
 Scenario ‘a’ Scenario ‘b’ Scenario ‘c’ 
12 6.514 4.429 4.132 
24 5.828 7.068 6.538 
36 6.514 5.762 4.784 
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CHARTS 
 
 
Chart 1: TIME PATHS OF ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
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Chart 2: STATIONARY VAR 
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CHART 3: GRAPHS OF IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS USING BANK 
RATE AS THE MONETARY POLICY INSRUMENT 
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CHART 4: GRAPHS OF IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS USING REPO RATE 
AS THE MONETARY POLICY INSRUMENT 
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CHART 5: GRAPHS OF IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS USING 
REVERSE REPO RATE AS THE MONETARY POLICY INSRUMENT 
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Chart  6 : BUFFER CAR OF PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS 
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